Outer House case concerning the nature and extent of tenants’ obligations under a lease of office premises at Chesser House on Gorgie Road in Edinburgh. Mapeley were the landlords and the City of  Edinburgh Council, the tenants.

At the expiry of the lease Mapeley served a schedule of dilapidations on the Council and sought payment of just over £8m.The interpretation of the tenant’s repairing obligations under the lease were at the centre of the dispute. There were two issues of interpretation for the court:

1. whether, in terms of the lease, the landlord was entitled to receive a sum equivalent to the cost of repairing the premises even if it had no intention of carrying out the required repairs; and
2. whether, in terms of the lease, the tenant was obliged to replace the plant and equipment on the premises at the end of the lease whatever the condition of those items (i.e. even if not missing, broken, worn, damaged or destroyed.)

In essence, the Council argued that, in terms of the lease, (a) the landlord was not entitled to recover the costs of putting the property into the standard of repair contained in the lease where the landlord did not intend to undertake the work and (b) the tenant did not require to replace or renew items of plant and equipment where the items were not missing, broken, worn, damaged or destroyed.

Lord Doherty found that the precise wording contained in lease was capable of bearing both that interpretation and the interpretation argued for by the landlord (per 1. and 2. above). However, where such wording is capable of bearing more than one meaning, the court requires to adopt the interpretation which best accords with business common sense. As such Lord Doherty preferred the interpretation contended for by the Council noting that, to adopt Mapeley’s approach, would have involved a radical departure from the common law which would have resulted in excessive and disproportionate consequences and, as a result, would have required to have been clearly indicated in the lease (which it had not been in the lease in question).

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Background
Supreme Court case concerning agreements between RBS and a property developer. In July 2007 the bank and the developer entered written agreements for loans of £845k and £560k in respect of the purchase of two plots of land at Gleneagles on which the developer was to build two houses.

Argument
The repayment date for the loans was in August 2008 and, when the developer failed to repay the loans at that date, the bank sued the developer for recovery of the funds. However, the developer counter claimed arguing that he had only entered into the loan agreements on the basis of assurances given by the Bank that it would make additional funding (of up to £700k) available to fund development on the plots and claimed damages in respect of the bank’s breach of those assurances. The assurances said to have been given by the bank included a telephone call prior to the signing of the agreements in which the developer was told that, in addition to the sums lent to buy the land, the bank would advance further funding for development of the land.

The central issue for the court was whether, on an objective assessment of the exchanges between the parties, the bank had entered into a legally binding agreement to lend Mr Carlyle the money for development of the plots in addition to money for their purchase.

Court of Session decisions
In the Outer House Lord Glennie found that bank had agreed a “collateral warranty” obliging them to lend for the development of the plots. However, the Inner House allowed an appeal finding that the telephone call only amounted to a statement of future intention and that legal obligations would only arise when the parties entered a written contract[1].

Supreme Court decision
The Supreme Court have allowed an appeal of the Inner House decision.

The court found that the Inner House had disagreed with Lord Glennie on questions of fact without having sufficient regard to the limited role an appeal court has in such questions. (Generally speaking, a court of appeal can only interfere with the decision of the judge at first instance on a question of fact where the decision of the judge cannot be reasonably be explained or justified on the evidence before him[2].)

In this case the court found that, although Lord Glennie could have interpreted the evidence differently and concluded that there was no obligation on the bank to lend the money for the development, he had a reasonable evidential basis for coming to the conclusion he had (i.e. that the bank had made a legally binding promise to provide the development funding).

The court also found that use of the term “collateral warranty” had been a distraction in this case and that the bank’s obligation could equally have been described as a “promise” or “unilateral undertaking”. In coming to its conclusion the court noted that, in Scots law, unlike the situation in England, a unilateral undertaking such as a promise can be binding without consideration from the recipient of the promise and that the undertaking or promise does not require to be collateral to another contract.

The full judgement is available from the Supreme Court here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

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 [1] The court said “If the [developer] considered that the [written agreements] did not properly reflect what he understood was to be agreed, or had been agreed orally, then he ought not to have signed the agreements. At all events, whatever the [developer] thought was the position, the informed observer would understand the written agreements to cover all matters agreed to date. It may well be that, at that time, the [bank] fully intended to enter into a further bargain with the [developer] to advance additional funding for the building works. However, they had not done so and did not do so. That may have been contrary to the spirit of the negotiations prior to the signing of the written agreements, but that spirit, or its moral content, cannot be taken as creating a legally binding voluntary obligation.”

[2] Lord Hodge’s judgement refers to the reasons for the restriction on the role of the appeal court highlighting that it is the judge at first instance who hears the evidence and is best placed to assess the credibility of the witnesses and, having heard the evidence over an extended period, will have “greater familiarity with the evidence and a deeper insight in reaching conclusions of fact than an appeal court whose perception may be narrowed or even distorted by the focused challenge to particular parts of the evidence”. Lord Hodge also noted the increased cost which would be incurred if all questions of fact were open for redetermination on appeal.

Outer House case concerning an alleged contract relating to the purchase of a local authority flat at Partick Bridge Street in Glasgow in 1989.

Mr Khosprowpour claimed that he had loaned £8k to Mrs Mackay for the purchase of her flat and that the parties had entered a contract by which Mrs Mackay would remain in the property for the rest of her life without repaying the loan but that Mrs Mackay would make a will transferring it to Mr Khosprowpour on her death. Mrs Mackay also granted a standard security (securing all sums due and which may become due) in favour of Mr Khosprowpour in 1991.

Although Mr Khosprowpour said that Mrs Mackay had originally granted a will passing the property to him, she later executed a new will directing that her executors pay the sale proceeds of the flat to her children (who included Mr Khosprowpour’s former wife).

Mr Khosprowpour sought damages for breach of contract. Mrs Mackay’s executor argued that, as a contract relating to heritage[1], the contract required to be constituted by probative writing (i.e. signed and witnessed) and was consequently not enforceable. On the other hand, Mr Khosprowpour argued that the contract did not relate to heritage but instead was an innominate or unusual contract and, as such, could be proved prout de jure (by any means known to law). Even if that were not the case, Mr Khosprowpour argued that, by virtue of his payment of the funds and Mrs Mackay’s execution of the first will, Mrs Mackay was personally barred[2] from relying on the lack of formalities to resile from the agreement. Conversely, Mrs Mackay’s executor argued the fact that the Standard Security was granted in security of sums due rather than an obligation to include a provision in the will suggested that payment of the funds and execution of the first will were not unequivocally referable to an obligation requiring her to leave the title to the flat to Mr Khosprowpour in her will.

After considering the authorities[3], Lord Turnbull found that the contract related to heritage and, as such, required formal writing for its constitution. However, it was found that Mr Khosprowpour had set out a stateable case regarding personal bar and a proof was allowed to consider whether it could be established.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

(NB: see appeal to Inner House here.)

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

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[1] As the alleged contract took place in 1989, the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 did not apply and the situation was governed by the pre-1995 Act common law rules on the requirements of writing.

[2] By virtue of the common law rule of rei interventus (where there are important actings by the party seeking to rely on the agreement which are known to and permitted by the other party and which are unequivocally referable to the purported contract.)

[3] In particular McEleveen v McQuillan’s Executrix 1997 SLT (Sh Ct) 46.

Background
Inner House case relating to a development at Rubislaw Quarry in Aberdeen. The developers sought the co-operation of those with interests (proprietors/tenants) in nearby office blocks (who were concerned that the new development would have a detrimental effect on the value of their properties) with respect to access to the development site. An agreement was entered into between the developers and the proprietors/tenants which included a restriction on the net lettable office space within the new development. The court action involved successors to the original parties to the agreement.

Arguments
The developers sought declarator that the relevant clause:

1. allowed the total amount of office space in the development to exceed the restriction (i.e. they argued that the restriction did not apply to owner occupied or vacant office space); and
2. was not a real burden and, as such, bound only the original parties to the agreement and not their successors.

Decision
Those arguments were rejected both in the Outer House and again on appeal to the Inner House.

Meaning of the clause
Taking account of the commercial purpose of the clause and the overall commercial context in which that agreement operated, the court found that the intention was to provide for a maximum floor area which was capable of being let for office use.

Whether binding on successors
Whether the burden was real (i.e. binding on successors) depended on whether the restriction on office space was:

1. purely a trading condition, designed solely to protect the personal commercial interests of those  interested in the offices; or
2. whether it, in addition to any personal benefit, also conveyed a material benefit on the properties themselves.

The proximity of the development to the offices was an important consideration (without physical proximity there can be no real burden). Not only were the properties adjacent to one another, it was intended that they should share the same access road.  The proprietors/tenants were seeking protection against reductions in rental values arising from the introduction of additional competition within the neighbourhood. The restriction therefore benefited the offices as commercial properties by protecting their rental value. The court also found that the clause did not result in an unreasonable restraint of trade noting that it had been negotiated as part of commercial agreement between the parties (there being no suggestion that there was any disparity in the parties’ bargaining power) which indicated that it was reasonable as between the parties. The clause merely restricted the amount of office space that could be constructed and did not prohibit use of the property as office space. Further, the court noted that there was no suggestion that the extent of the actual restriction imposed was in any way unreasonable or disproportionate in the context of the whole of the Rubislaw developments.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

The issue
Inner House case in which RBS sought payment of sums due under a personal guarantee granted by Mr O’Donnell and Mr MacDonald the directors of Whinhill Developments Ltd which had been formed to purchase a potential development site at Stone Farm in Greenock. The directors argued that the guarantee had been induced by negligent misrepresentations made on behalf of RBS.

The background
RBS and Whinhill entered a one year loan agreement in September 2007 whereby RBS would provide a loan of £1.65m to fund the purchase. Whinhill bought the site for about £1.5m and planned to obtain planning permission then sell the site to a builder or developer. Whinhill granted a standard security and floating charge in favour of RBS (the site being Whinhill’s only asset).  Whinhill were unable to repay the loan at its expiry in September 2008. The parties then agreed to refinance the loan facility with a new loan of £1.695m to be repaid by March 2011; the Whinhill directors providing a personal guarantee for the company’s liabilities to a maximum aggregate value of £300k.

Whinhill failed to repay the sums due after a default event occurred and RBS sought payment of the sums due under the guarantee in February 2011. Central to the case was the property crash in 2008 and the falling value of the property. The loan was originally advanced in mid-2007 on the strength of a market valuation of £3m. When the facility was refinanced in 2008, property values had “fallen off a cliff” and the credit division of RBS was enforcing a 70% loan to value ratio. However, Whinhill’s relationship director in RBS’s commercial banking division was keen to avoid the crystallisation of, what may have been by then, a worthless security. He received word from Ryden that the property could be valued at £2m which, with a personal guarantee from Whinhill’s directors, would allow the 70% loan to value ratio to be met.

On three separate occasions RBS told the directors that Ryden would or had re-valued the subjects at £2m. The directors had understood the revaluation could be relied on for lending and guarantee purposes and, in the Outer House, Lord Malcolm took the view that it was reasonable for them to do so. Shortly after the first occasion (but before the second), RBS’s relationship director received the updated valuation from Ryden by letter. However, the letter made it clear that the report was not suitable, nor to be relied on by the bank, for lending purposes (it was also based on an assumption of increased development density which had not been discussed with the Whinhill directors). The directors were not informed of this and there was no evidence that the report had been received by the directors who then granted the personal guarantee in favour of the bank.

The decision
In the Outer House Lord Malcolm found that the RBS statements were material factors in the directors’ decision to grant the guarantee and that the guarantee would not have been granted if they had been aware of the true position. As a result, a reduction of the guarantee was granted.

Whether the Whinhill directors were also entitled to damages for their losses depended on whether the misrepresentations amounted to a breach of a duty of care owed to them. Lord Malcolm found that, in using the assurance given by Ryden before receipt of the report to help persuade the Whinhill directors to agree to the guarantee, the relationship director had to be taken as having assumed responsibility for its accuracy. He then came under an obligation of enquiry or disclosure if he subsequently received material which cast doubt on the information given to the directors. And thereafter, he had a duty not to repeat the misrepresentation. The relationship director had breached that duty and the Whinhill directors were entitled to damages for loss sustained as a consequence.

The Inner House were in agreement with Lord Malcom’s findings and refused an appeal.

The full judgement is available here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Background
Outer House case relating to the lease of commercial premises in Port Glasgow. @SIPP were the landlords and Insight, the tenants. @SIPP argued that, when the lease came to an end, the premises were not in good and substantial condition and a dispute arose as to the extent of the tenants repairing obligations under the lease.

There were two issues for the court to decide.

• Whether the tenants’ obligation on termination of the lease was limited to putting the premises into the condition in which they were accepted by it at the commencement of the lease.
• Whether the landlord was entitled to payment of a sum equal to the cost of putting the premises into the relevant state of repair, regardless of whether it actually intended to carry out any such work.

Decision
Putting and keeping
Lord Tyre began by rejecting @SIPP’s contention[1] that an obligation to keep the premises in good and substantial repair necessarily imports an obligation to put the premises in that condition regardless of its condition at the commencement of the lease. Then, taking a modern approach (which requires the court to consider what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant by the language they used, rather than necessarily imposing interpretation which is grammatical result of the language used) to construction of the relevant clause, Lord Tyre found that the tenant’s obligation was referable to the condition in which they were accepted at the commencement of the lease (and not the condition in which they were deemed to have been accepted).

Remedy for breach of the repairing obligation
Where a tenant breaches its obligation to return the premises to the condition specified in the lease at the end of the term, the landlord is entitled to common law damages for the loss sustained. The landlord will normally argue that that loss amounts to the cost required to put the premises into the specified condition. However, that will not be the measure of the loss in all cases. In some cases the proper measure of loss may be the diminution in the capital value of the subjects[2] and in some cases, for example where the building is to be demolished (for reasons unconnected with the tenant’s breach), the landlord may be unable to show any loss at all.

In this case @SIPP argued that the relevant clause in the lease provided an express right to payment of a sum equivalent to the cost required to put the premises into good and substantial repair and that in exercising that contractual right it was not making a claim for damages for its loss.

However, Lord Tyre found that there was nothing in the relevant clause compelling the interpretation favoured by @SIPP. In the view of Lord Tyre, a lease would require very clear wording to allow a conclusion that the tenant had to pay a sum which bore no relation to that required to compensate the landlord for the loss actually sustained as a result of a breach of the repairing obligation.

As such, Insight were entitled to prove that @SIPP’s loss was equivalent something other than the cost of repair and the case was put out by order for discussion as to further procedure[3].

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here

(NB see appeal to Inner House appeal here)

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

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[1] This argument was based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in L Batley Pet Products Ltd v North Lanarkshire Council[2014] UKSC 27, however, Lord Tyre found that the reference to putting/keeping the property in good condition related to a commentary on the particular clause used in that case rather than making a general statement/change as to the law.

[2] In this case the estimated cost of the works required was over £1m whereas Insight argued that even if it had carried out all of the works in the schedule of dilapidations, the capital value of the premises would only have increased by £175k.

[3]The question of whether @SIPP would be entitled to recover the cost of the repairs if it could prove an intention to carry out the repairs regardless of the extent to which the cost of the repairs would exceed the increase in capital value of the subjects was left open.

Case from the Court of Appeal for England and Wales concerning a sale of freehold property in the West Midlands. The central issue for the court was whether VAT was payable on the purchase price.

The Purchase Price was defined in the contract as being £130k (no mention was made of VAT in the definition). However, the contract also incorporated the Standard Conditions of Sale[1] (4^th Edition) except where they were in conflict with the express terms of the contract.

Clause 1.4 of the Standard Conditions provides:

“1.4.1   An obligation to pay money includes an obligation to pay any value added tax chargeable in respect of that payment.

1.4.2     All sums made payable by the contract are exclusive of value added tax.”

Contracts were exchanged and the transaction completed in August 2006. CLP, the seller, opted to tax and became liable to pay VAT on the transaction. HMRC raised a notice of assessment in late 2007. In March 2008 CLP’s solicitors wrote to the purchasers’ solicitors indicating that the purchasers were liable to pay the VAT due (£22,750) to CLP. The purchasers failed to pay and CLP raised proceedings against them.

The court noted that the only reasonable interpretation of clause 1.4 was that the purchasers would have liability for any VAT. Also, previous case law provided powerful support for CLP’s argument that the purchase price of £130k was exclusive of VAT and that the purchasers were liable for any VAT due on the transaction.

However, the analysis did not end with the ascertainment of the meaning of clause 1.4; the contract had to be interpreted as a whole in the light of all the circumstances of the parties’ relationship and the relevant facts surrounding the transaction known to them. In that regard the following points were relevant.

It was never suggested that CLP ever communicated to the purchasers that it had exercised the option to tax.

1. The purchasers were individuals and, whilst the property was commercial, there had never been any suggestion that they were aware or had any reason to suppose that the transaction might be subject to a VAT charge.
2. The purchase price for the property had been agreed in principle a considerable time before completion and had been paid over by the purchasers to CLP by, at the latest, 2005. There was never any suggestion that VAT might be payable, still less that the purchasers would be liable for it. To the contrary, a letter from CLP’s solicitors in March 2006 contained an express acknowledgement that CLP had received “all of the sale monies of £130,000 on this matter, subject to contract”.
3. The standard requisitions had asked for details of the exact amount payable on completion and had elicited the response: “Balance of purchase monies”. No hint was given that VAT was or might be payable.
4. The contract provided that the “Purchase price” was £130k. It contained no indication that this price was exclusive of VAT. Indeed it was clear that this and no other sum was due upon completion because the contract included a table in which details of any “Other payments/ allowances” could have been (but were not) included. Moreover, and importantly, the contract provided that where there was any conflict between the express terms of the contract and the Standard Conditions, the express terms of the contract would prevail.

Taking all these matters into consideration the Court took the view that a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have intended that nothing was or could become payable by the purchasers over and above the specified purchase price of £130k.

Notably, in the particular circumstances of the case, the court found that it was not possible to interpret “Purchase price” as the price exclusive of VAT. As such, it considered that a reasonable person would consider that the express terms of the contract were not reconcilable with clause 1.4 of the Standard Conditions. In those circumstances, the court held that the express terms of the contract had to prevail.

The full judgement is available from BAILII here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Background
This is an Outer House case concerning a lease of premises at the Gyle Shopping Centre in Edinburgh under which Gyle was the landlord and Marks & Spencer, the tenant.

Gyle entered an agreement with Primark for the erection of a new store on land which included part of a car park. However, Marks & Spencer’s premises were let together with a one-third pro indiviso share of shared areas which included the car park. In an earlier decision Lord Tyre had found that (1) the building of the Primark store would breach the lease with Marks & Spencer and (2) a meeting of the shopping centre management committee approving construction of the new building was not sufficient to vary the terms of the lease.

Arguments
Here Gyle argued that, although the lease had not been varied, Marks & Spencer were personally barred from objecting to the construction of the building as Marks & Spencer’s representatives had agreed to the building at the shopping centre management committee and that Gyle had relied on that agreement with their knowledge.

In particular Gyle argued that M&S was personally barred:

1. in terms of s1(3) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995;
2. in terms of the (pre-1995 Act) common law rule of rei interventus; or
3. by waiving its right under the lease.

Decision
Lord Tyre rejected those arguments.

The 1995 Act
Lord Tyre found (in accordance with the decision of Lord Drummond Young in Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll[1]) that s1(3) does not apply to leases; noting that s1(3) applies only to separate contracts relating to the land (i.e. transactions giving rise to merely personal rights) and not to dispositions and other deeds which actually effect the creation or transfer of an interest in land (i.e. transactions giving rise to a real right).

Rei interventus
With regard to the common law rule of rei interventus, Lord Tyre found that the (pre-1995 Act) common law rules (relating to both rei interventus and homologation) had been replaced in their entirety by the statutory rules contained in the 1995 Act and did not continue in parallel.

Waiver
On the subject of a potential waiver of Marks & Spencer’s rights in the lease, Lord Tyre said the following:

 “In my opinion, the evidence falls well short of establishing that there has been voluntary, informed and unequivocal waiver by [Marks & Spencer] of its right to prevent the construction and leasing of the building.  It seems to me that [Gyle’s] analysis perpetuates its original error of treating [Marks & Spencer’s] representatives who attended and approved the minutes of Management Committee meetings as equivalent to [Marks & Spencer] itself.  It wrongly characterises the conduct of those individuals as the conduct of [Marks & Spencer].  As I have already held, those individuals were not empowered in terms of [Marks & Spencer’s] lease to take decisions affecting [Marks & Spencer’s] real rights in the Shared Areas.  There was no evidence to indicate that they were even aware of what those rights were, although it was clear that the question of real rights was given no consideration by those representing [Gyle].  Nor was there any evidence of actings on the part of any person within [Marks & Spencer’s] organisation who was truly responsible for taking decisions regarding the variation of real rights under the lease which might induce [Gyle] to believe that [Marks & Spencer] regarded such decision-making as falling within the competence of the Management Committee.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here

(See also summaries of decisions finding (1) that M&S had not consented to the building of the Primark Store and that the building of the store without consent would be a breach of the lease (2)  that M&S was not unreasonably withholding consent to the Primark development.)

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Inner House case concerning a lease of a unit in a large (and mostly unoccupied) industrial complex in Shotts. Dem-Master were the landlords and Alba, the tenants.

Background
Dem-Master raised an action for payment in respect of electricity and outstanding rent. Alba disputed that the sums were due and a secondary issue arose regarding access to the property. Alba argued that Dem-Master had restricted vehicular access to the property by securing gates and locking loading bay doors which were used to allow heavy goods plants and equipment to be manoeuvred into the premises.

Alba sought an interim interdict to prevent Dem-Master restricting access to the premises in such a way as to prevent their rights under the lease. Dem-master granted an undertaking allowing access via a defined route and Alba dropped their motion for interim interdict but subsequently returned to court arguing that Dem-master had failed to comply with the undertaking.

Arguments
Alba argued that they were unable to carry on their business and that they wished to vacate their premises and move to other premises but that they were unable to remove their plant and machinery without access to the loading bay door. Dem-Master argued that Alba had no right to exercise access via the loading bay doors in terms of the lease and, in view of the fact that Alba’s published accounts showed them to be insolvent, they were concerned that removal of Alba’s plant and machinery would prevent use of the Landlord’s hypothec (i.e. the right to retain a tenant’s property as security).

Decision
In the Outer House the motion for interim interdict was granted so as to allow access via the loading bay doors. The Inner House found that, on a construction of the lease (under which the landlord, acting reasonably was entitled to designate the route of the rights of access), it could not be said that Alba had the right to use the loading bay doors. However, the court did find that the balance of convenience (required to allow an interim interdict) did favour access over another route which would allow Alba to operate their business from the premises (but which would not allow the removal of their heavy plant and machinery from the unit).

The case was put out by order to discuss the exact terms of the order for interim interdict.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case in concerning the interpretation of the lease of a plot in a chalet park in Lochgoilhead.

Mr and Mrs Ramsay bought a (removable) chalet in the park (for £20.5k) from Drimsynie. As part of the same transaction, the Ramsays entered into a 10 year ground lease of the plot on which the chalet was located. The lease provided that, on expiry of the lease, Drimsynie would have:

 “..the option to acquire the chalet at a price to be agreed, failing agreement at a price to be determined by an arbiter to be appointed in terms of clause FIFTEENTH…or offer to (the Ramsays) a renewal of the lease for a period to be determined by (Drimsynie)….”

When Drimsynie terminated the lease (following a change policy which involved replacing chalets with newer, larger, and more expensive chalets), an arbiter was been appointed to determine the sum to be paid for the chalet and a dispute developed as to how the arbiter should approach the valuation of the chalet. The Ramsays argued that the chalet should be valued on the assumption of a continuing right to occupy it on the plot on which it was located. Alternatively, Drimsynie contended the arbiter should consider only the market value of the chalet itself on the basis it would be removed from the plot.

Lord Malcolm found that his task was to interpret the lease by reference to the understanding of a reasonable person in the position of the parties at the time the lease was entered. It was important to note that the lease was not a stand alone contract and was linked to the associated purchase of the chalet. The effect of the relevant clause was that the Ramsays could remain in occupation of the chalet on the plot in terms of the lease until the chalet was purchased by the Drimsynie. If Drimsynie wanted to put a new chalet on the site and sell it to someone else they would require to purchase the old chalet first. In Lord Malcolm’s view the parties would have understood that Drimsynie was buying out the Ramsays’ right to continue to use the chalet on the plot in terms of the lease. As such, a reasonable person in the position of the parties at the time of the lease would have understood that Drimsynie would purchase the chalet on the same footing as they sold it. He found support for this view from the element of permanence associated with the chalet, noting that:

• the lease described the chalet as having been “erected” on the plot
• although simply resting on its foundations, it was connected to services, including water and drainage
• the chalet had been on the site since about 1967 and was shown on the OS map
• the Ramsays paid council tax in respect of the chalet.

Lord Malcolm therefore held that that the arbiter should value the chalet on the basis that it could be used on the site for so long as it remained habitable.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.