Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body v The Sovereign Indigenous Peoples of Scotland, 5 May 2016 – removal of protestors camping at the Scottish Parliament

This is an Outer House case in which the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body sought an order for removal of a group of individuals camped within the grounds of the Scottish Parliament with the stated intension of remaining there until Scotland declares itself an independent country.

Lord Turnbull found that the corporate body was the valid proprietor of the grounds on which the camp was located, that the campers had no lawful right to encroach upon the corporate body’s property and found that arguments made by the campers concerning the impact of the Treaty of Union (leading to the creation of Great Britain) on the provision of the corporate body’s powers by the Scotland Act 1998 had no foundation. Lord Turnbull also rejected arguments based on rights claimed by the campers under The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People of 2007 and, in addition, found that the campers’ occupation of the camp did not fall within rights of access (the “right to roam”) created under the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003.

However, Lord Turnbull did find that, as the corporate body is a public body, it is unlawful for it to act in a way which is incompatible with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As such, it was necessary to consider whether granting an order for removal of the campers was compatible with the rights guaranteed by the convention; in particular article 10 (freedom of expression) and article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). Consequently, Lord Turnbull granted a procedural hearing anticipating that it would lead to a further hearing to consider evidence on the proportionality of granting the order removing the camp (i.e. to allow the corporate body’s right to the removal order to be assessed against the campers right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association).

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.


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Elsick Development Co Ltd v Aberdeen City and Shire Stratetgic Development Planning Authority, 29 April 2016 – validity of planning obligation in s.75 agreement.

Inner House case considering an appeal relating to a section 75 agreement between Elsick Development Company and Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire Strategic Development Planning Authority. EDC wished to construct a development at Elsick (near Stonehaven). The agreement provided for EDC to make payments to a Strategic Transport Fund in terms of non-statutory Supplementary Planning Guidance. EDC had concerns that the planning guidance was invalid and, in terms of the agreement, no contribution was to be paid if the guidance was found to be invalid.

EDC argued before the Inner House (amongst other things) that the Supplementary Planning Guidance was contrary to national planning policy as it failed to comply with the requirement that any planning obligation must relate directly to the development proposed (as is provided for in the Scottish Government Planning Circular “Planning Obligations and Good Neighbour Agreements (Circular 3/2012)).

The court allowed the appeal finding that:

“It is a fundamental principle of planning law that a condition attached to the grant of planning permission, whether contained in a section 75 Agreement or otherwise, must “fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted development” …  This principle is reflected and explained by the Scottish Government Circular (3/2012) …  This makes it clear to planning authorities that an obligation must be “related and proportionate in scale and kind to the development”

 However, the court concluded that the Strategic Transport Fund was designed to pay for transport projects and infrastructure (“interventions”) which were not directly related to the proposed development.

 “The STF, and the requirement in the statutory Supplementary Guidance (SG) to contribute to it, may be regarded as a sound idea in political or general planning terms.  It may be seen as an imaginative idea which allows advanced strategic planning objectives to be achieved in a structured manner, financed by new development.  That does not, however, permit the imposition of an obligation on a developer to contribute to an intervention which is simply not related to the proposed development…  It may be that legislation could authorise the type of contribution envisaged by the [planning authority] …  but it has not yet done so in Scotland.”

 The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

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Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016

An Act of the Scottish Parliament making provision for:

  • a land rights and responsibilities statement (to be reviewed every five years) to contain principles for guiding the development of public policy on land rights;
  • establishing a Scottish Land Commission (to monitor the system governing ownership and management of land and to recommend changes in the public interest);
  • a public register of persons with a controlling interest in land (aimed at improving transparency of landownership);
  • requiring that Ministers issue guidance on the circumstances in which landowners should carry out engagement with the community;
  • empowering communities to buy land where it is necessary to further sustainable development;
  • the application of non-domestic rates to shootings and deer forests;
  • empowering local authorities to change the use of inalienable common good land;
  • additional powers for Scottish Natural Heritage to intervenewhere the management of deer by landowners and occupiers is not delivering in the public interest;
  • amendments and procedural clarifications to be made to the access rights over land  contained in Part 1 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003; and
  • reform of the agricultural holdings legislation (aimed at improving relationships and re-dressing imbalances between tenants and landlords).

The Act received Royal Assent on 22 April but further regulations are required to bring the various provisions into force.

The Act is available here.


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Ross Cooper v Simon Marriott, 30 March 2016 – application of tenancy deposit scheme where property alleged not to be tenant’s main home and tenant accused of dishonesty

Sheriff court case concerning a short assured tenancy of a flat in Edinburgh in relation to which a deposit of £550 was paid to the landlord but not paid into an approved tenancy deposit scheme as required under the Tenancy Deposit Schemes (Scotland) Regulations 2011. The tenant applied to the sheriff for an award of an amount of money as a sanction for the landlord’s failure to comply with his obligation under the regulations.

The landlord argued that:

  1. the tenancy was not protected by the 2011 regulations because the property was not ‘the principal home’ of the tenant during the duration of the lease (as the tenant had worked 3 and half days a week in Skye for a period of 6 months); and
  2. even if the tenancy was protected by the regulations, a new tenancy was created in June 2014 in respect of which no deposit was made (meaning any action under the original lease would have been time barred at the time of the court action);  and
  3. if the application was not time barred, the sanction provision was unenforceable, by the tenant, due to his dishonesty and illegality.

The sheriff rejected all of these arguments.

In the first place, the question of the tenant’s principal home did not have any bearing on the case. (The landlord had referred to the definition of an assured tenancy contained in s12 of the Housing Scotland Act 1988 which requires that the property is the tenant’s only or principal home. However, this was a short assured tenancy not an assured tenancy)

In the second place, although the tenancy agreement commenced on 15 June 2013 for a period of 12 months until 14 June 2014, it continued, with the consent of parties, until it terminated on 17 July 2015. Whilst the landlord had argued that a new lease was created in June 2014, the sheriff held that the tenancy was continued after 14 June 2014 on the principle of tacit relocation[1]. In coming to this conclusion, the sheriff noted that, after 14 June, the parties to the contract were the same, the property was the same and the only change was that the landlord had abated the rent by £50 because of a problem with the water supply. As such, the sheriff had no reason to think there was anything other than an extension to the original lease. (Meaning the action had been raised in sufficient time (i.e. within 3 months of 17 July 2015) in terms of reg. 9(1) of the 2011 Regulations).

Finally, the principle of illegality referred to by the landlord had no application to this case. (Although the sheriff also found that the landlord’s allegations in this regard were unsubstantiated). The sheriff stated that, although in some cases of partial breach of the regulations where the deposit was ultimately paid into to the scheme, the conduct of the tenant could be relevant to the sanction, where the deposit is never lodged, he failed to see how the tenant’s character could ever mitigate the breach.

As such, a sanction of twice the value of the deposit[2] was awarded[3].

It is also of note that, with regard to arguments by the Landlord to the effect that he had not understood the regulations and was only an ‘amateur landlord’, the sheriff said the following:

 “the regulations do not recognise the status of ‘amateur landlord’.  Landlords who rent to the public are covered by the regulations whether they are large commercial concerns or single property, buy to let landlords.”

 The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.


[1] Where the term of a lease comes to an end and the tenancy then renews itself on the same terms and conditions.

[2] The maximum award is three times the value of the deposit.

[3] Less £50 for minor damage which had occurred to the property.

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Charlotte Waelde v Felix Ulloa, 29 March 2016 – liability for windows in tenement roof

This is a Sheriff Court case concerning the liability for repairs to the roof of a building in Edinburgh.

The building was formerly a single dwelling but subdivided into three flats and fell within the definition of a tenement in terms of the Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004. The title deeds contained a burden sharing the cost of repairs to the roof on the basis of the assessed rentals for the flats.

Ms Waelde was seeking the recovery of the costs of repair of a skylight and Velux window in the roof of the property from the owner of one of the other flats.

Velux Window
With regard to the Velux, Mr Ulloa argued that, because the Velux had been added after creation of the burden, the burden did not apply to it. That argument was not accepted by the sheriff who, noting that the repairs were to the outer edge of the frame of the Velux and the wall separating the building from the building next door, was “attracted by the idea” that a roof should:

“be taken to include parts added thereto which are of the same character; and that an obligation to contribute to the cost of maintaining it created by the type of burden in the present case should be treated as extending to the cost of maintaining same.”

Also, the sheriff noted that Mr Ulloa had bought his flat after the Velux window had been added and took the view that Mr Ulloa had acquiesced in the presence of the Velux and the burden should be interpreted in a way consistent with the window forming part of the roof.

However, although the sheriff could make a finding in principle that Ms Waelde could recover the costs of repairs to the Velux, Ms Waelde did not provide evidence as to the rateable values of the flats and consequently the sheriff found that her case in that regard had to fail.

With regard to the skylight, the sheriff found that the repairs (replacement of Flashband tape on the surfaces of the glass panes themselves) were not repairs to the roof and consequently the title burden did not apply. However, the sheriff found that the skylight acceded to the roof. And, whilst that did not mean the skylight became part of the roof, it did mean that it was part of the building. But, as the roof was common property and the skylight acceded to it, the skylight was common property too (the sheriff noted that he came to this conclusion with some hesitation). In terms of the Tenement Management Scheme (TMS) contained in the 2004 Act, common property is “scheme property” and in terms of Rule 4(2)(a) of the TMS, MR Ulloa was liable for one third of the cost of maintaining the skylight.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

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Reclaiming motion in the petition of St Andrews Environmental Protection Association Limited for Judicial Review, 18 March 2016 – planning decision on location of new Madras College

Inner House case concerning a petition for judicial review of the decision of Fife Council to grant planning permission for the building of a new Madras College on greenbelt land at Pipeland on the outskirts of St Andrews.

The current Madras College is located on two sites and in need of replacement. The Executive Committee of Fife Council (as the education authority) had agreed, amongst other things, that a replacement school should, where possible, be situated on a single site. Planning permission for the building of a new school on a single site at Pipeland was granted on 16 May 2014 subject to a number of conditions.

In the Outer House, the petitioners had argued that the council decision (and preceding planning officer’s report) had treated the education authority’s criteria as if they had been overriding planning requirements and so had failed to balance the educational considerations with the relevant planning considerations for the alternative sites. The petitioners also contended that the decision to rule out an alternative site at North Haugh (identified as a school site on the local plan) as it was too small ignored the possibility of combining it with the current playing fields at Station Park (with which it could have been linked by means of an underpass).

Lord Malcolm refused the petition in the Outer House and the petitioners appealed.

The Inner House allowed that appeal.

As the locating of the school at Pipeland was contrary to the development plan, it could only be approved if justified by sufficiently weighty material considerations[1].  In this regard, national planning policy provides that such a development can be approved where there is proven need and an absence of a suitable and available alternative site.

Where the planning authority was satisfied as to the need for the school and that the effect of a school on the greenbelt could not be mitigated, the key question was whether the school should be at Pipeland or on an alternative site with less environmental consequences. As to that, the planning authority:

“had to assess the respective merits and demerits of the other sites as compared with the merits and demerits of Pipeland.  The preferences and requirements of the applicant were relevant factors, but by no means decisive.  Any applicant developer, whether for retail, housing, or an educational development, will be influenced, perhaps primarily influenced, by its own interests.  The role of the planning authority is to reflect and safeguard the wider public interest in the proper planning of development in the area, including appropriate protection and conservation of the environment.  This is where the question of the suitability of alternative sites comes into the picture.  Given the acknowledged significant harm caused by development at Pipeland, if, in the opinion of the planning authority, a satisfactory alternative could be found which is consistent with the development plan and causes significantly less environmental harm, that would be a clear reason for refusal of the current application.”

In this case, the court found that the factor which had influenced the planning authority’s decision was the separation of the North Haugh site and the conflict this brought with the education authority’s desire for a single site. The planning authority had accepted the education authority’s decision as to the site instead of exercising its own planning judgement. However, the planning authority should have made up its own mind as to the alternative sites and have done so with regard to planning considerations[2].

“The planning authority was diverted from the planning judgment which it required to carry out if properly exercising its jurisdiction.  The full council was effectively told that it should ignore the issue as to whether the green belt could be protected by using an urban site, because the applicant had already considered the matter and its decision was determinative.  Thus the councillors were put in the position that if they wanted a new Madras College, and that had been a pressing need for many years, they would have to sanction development at Pipeland.”

 The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.


[1] In terms of s25 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997

[2] The judgement includes a postscript on the dangers involved when a Council is both an applicant and a planning authority.

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Simon Christopher Philip Barr v. Dunbar Assets Plc, 18 March 2016 –potential reduction of guarantee alleged to have been obtained by bank’s misrepresentations

Outer House case in which a property developer (Mr Barr) sought reduction of a personal guarantee executed by him in favour of Dunbar Bank in 2008.

In 2006 Mr Barr and his business partner sought to acquire land near Tain for a development. To do so they established a limited partnership (Edenroc) registered in the Isle of Man which was to purchase the property with funding from Dunbar Bank.

Extensive negotiations took place between the bank and Edenroc during which 6 facility letters (each of which superseded the previous letter and only the last of which was executed) constituting offers of loan were sent to Edenroc by the bank. The first four of the letters made reference to the requirement for a joint and several guarantee to be granted by Mr Barr and his business partner. However, this requirement was not included in the last two letters which made reference (as had the fourth letter) to a requirement for “[a]ny other security as we [the bank] may, at our absolute discretion, require.” The fifth facility letter had been sent with a further separate letter addressed to Edenroc confirming that there was to be a joint and several guarantee granted by Mr Barr and his business partner. That letter also included an annexed form which Mr Barr and his business partner had signed as evidence of their agreement to the proposal.

The formalities of the loan transaction were executed 5 days after the final (sixth) facility letter and Mr Barr attended at Edenroc’s solicitors’ office to sign the personal guarantee. The document he signed was an individual guarantee by him (including a cover page indicating that it was an individual guarantee) and not a joint and several guarantee granted with his business partner.

The development failed in 2011 and the bank sought to enforce the individual guarantee against Mr Barr who sought reduction of the guarantee on the basis that he had been induced into entering it by misrepresentations by the bank.

In particular he claimed that the prior facility letters (referring to the joint and several guarantee) were misrepresentations and that one of the bank’s employees (who was said by Mr Barr to have informed him that the bank never called up guarantees). Although Mr Barr accepted that he had signed the guarantee freely, he said he had signed the document without reading it and was unaware of the content and did not think it was necessary to obtain legal advice (although he had signed it in the presence of a friend who was usually his solicitor but in this case was acting for Edenroc).

Lord Armstrong rejected those arguments, holding that no misrepresentations were made to Mr Barr and that he had not been induced by the bank to sign the guarantee.

Lord Armstrong concluded that no express representation had been made by the bank in terms of the final facility letter that a joint and several guarantee would be required from Mr Barr. As each of the facility letters superseded the last, and only the final letter was executed, it was that letter which governed the documentation required at completion of the loan transaction. (The letters prior to the final letter merely represented ongoing negotiations and the signed form which had been sent with the fifth letter simply indicated Mr Barr’s (and his business partner’s) willingness to provide a joint and several guarantee if the funds had been advanced in terms of that letter (i.e. if the fifth letter had been the final letter)).

Moreover, there was no basis for inferring from the relevant documentation, however implicitly, that the guarantee required would be joint and several. In particular, Lord Armstrong noted that Mr Barr had not been a party to the facility letters (which had been between the Bank and Edenroc- a separate legal entity Mr Barr had gone to some trouble to set up).

Lord Armstrong also found that he did not believe Mr Barr’s evidence (taking account of his previous experience as a developer) that he had not read the document, did not appreciate the significance of what he was doing and, in particular, that he would not have signed the document without the bank’s alleged representations.

In coming to his conclusions Lord Armstrong noted:

“In the context of cautionary obligations it is well settled that as a general rule the cautioner is expected to look after his own interests and to make such enquiries as he considers necessary or appropriate.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

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Gyle Shopping Centre General Partners Limited v Marks & Spencer Plc, 16 March 2016 – Interpretation of commercial lease at Gyle Shopping Centre in Edinburgh

Inner House case concerning the interpretation of a lease of premises at the Gyle Shopping Centre in Edinburgh under which Gyle was the landlord and Marks & Spencer, the tenant.

Gyle entered an agreement with Primark for the erection of a new store on land which included part of a car park. However, M&S’s premises were let together with a one-third pro indiviso share of shared areas which included the car park. In two previous decisions Lord Tyre found (1) that M&S had not consented to the building of the Primark Store and that the building of the store without consent would be a breach of the lease[1] and (2) that M&S was not personally barred from preventing Gyle from erecting the store on the car park[2].

Gyle then wrote to M&S and requested consent but did not receive it. In this case Gyle sought declarator that a refusal of consent to the Primark development by M&S amounted to an unreasonable withholding of consent. In the Outer House Lord Tyre granted the declarator[3]. M&S then appealed that decision.

The relevant clause in the lease provided that certain works could be carried out to the shared areas by a shopping centre management committee (which included a representative from M&S) where the parties (including M&S) consented that they accepted that the works would not render the mall or shared areas materially less adequate, commodious or convenient to them. The clause also provided that the consent could not be unreasonably withheld.

M&S argued that the clause permitted works of redevelopment, modernisation, refurbishment, replacement and renewal, but not a new development such as the new Primark store. In particular they argued that the clause did not permit removal of the shared areas from M&S’s lease and that it did not permit the piecemeal erosion of M&S’s real property rights without formal documentation recorded in the appropriate register.

The Inner House allowed the appeal. In doing so, the court noted that it is necessary to consider the structure and provisions of the lease in the context of well-established principles of Scottish land law. As to which, the court said:

“Scots law governing land tenure and leases is based upon written titles registered either in the Land Register (formerly the Register of Sasines), or in the Books of Council and Session, or in both.  A duly recorded title relating to land is a real right which can be defended against the world.  It is not a mere personal right binding only the granter and grantee.  The real right runs with the land, and is passed to successors in title.  Alterations in title generally require a written deed duly registered or, following the introduction of digitalisation, an alteration in the electronic land register.”

 And, having noted the benefits of clarity, certainty, and accessibility for the public which arise from the principles, the Court went on to say:

“Against that background, any intention by contracting parties to dispense with the well‑settled and accepted conveyancing requirements relating to real rights in land would, in our opinion, require to be very clearly expressed.  Moreover any such approach would generally be regarded as ill-advised, as the resultant informal approach to title alterations would be likely to lead to confusion and doubt about the nature and extent of a party’s title to and/or interest in the land.”

Then, looking at the particular wording in the lease, the Inner House concluded that there was nothing in the provisions of the lease which would permit an interpretation altering M&S’s real rights and boundaries and allowing the building of the Primark Store.

 The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.


[1] Gyle Shopping Centre General Partners Ltd as Trustee for and General Partner of Gyle Shopping Centre Limited Partnership v. Marks and Spencer Plc, 25 March 2014. See summary here.
[2] Gyle Shopping Centre General Partners Ltd as Trustee for and General Partner of Gyle Shopping Centre Limited Partnership v. Marks and Spencer Plc, 6 August 2014. See summary here.
[3] Gyle Shopping Centre General Partners Ltd as Trustee for and General Partner of Gyle Shopping Centre Limited Partnership v. Marks and Spencer Plc, 12 February 2015. See summary here.

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Petition of Glenmorie Wind Farm Limited for Judicial Review of a decision of the Scottish Ministers, 1 March 2016 –rejection of permission for Glenmorie Wind Farm

Outer House case considering a petition for judicial review challenging a decision of the Scottish Ministers (adopting the recommendation of their reporter and) refusing Glenmorie Wind Farm Limited’s application for permission to build 34 wind turbines in Easter Ross, north of Inverness.

At the centre of the case was proposed development’s proximity to, and potential impact on areas of wild land and the fact that, after the reporter’s report but before the Scottish Minister’s decision to refuse permission for the wind farm, Scottish Natural Heritage issued a new map identifying areas of wild land and the Scottish Government published a new National Planning Policy.

Glenmorie argued that:

  1. there had been procedural unfairness, a breach of natural justice and a  denial of legitimate expectations;
  2. the Ministers had left material considerations out of account and had given inadequate reasons for the decision; and
  3. that the Ministers had made a methodological error in coming to their decision.

Procedural unfairness
After the new map was issued and the new policy was published the Ministers invited submissions from the parties but later withdrew the request when they realised that further representations were not required and they had sufficient information to make the decision. Glenmorie had accepted this at the time but contended that the Ministers had considered the new map/policy and drawn adverse implications from them when reaching their decision and so should have allowed Glenmorie to make further representations in relation to the new map/policy. However Lady Wise rejected this argument noting that Glenmorie had indicated that they had been content that the Ministers were entitled to reach a decision without hearing further representations, that there was no suggestion that representations were considered from any of the parties and that, whilst the withdrawal of the invitation to make representations had resulted in inconvenience to (all of) the parties, that did not equate to material prejudice to Glenmorie.

Material considerations
Lady Wise also rejected Glenmorie’s contention that their position on the new map/policy was a material consideration which ought to have been taken into account and concluded that, when the Minister’s decision letter was read together with the reporter’s report, there was no lack of intelligibility.

Methodological error
In addition Glenmorie contended that the reporter fell into error by adopting an inconsistent approach when considering the impact on the landscape character of the proposed development on the one hand and, on the other hand, the cumulative impact. (Essentially, they argued that the reporter identified other nearby wind farms when considering the cumulative effect of those with the proposed wind farm but failed to take account of their detrimental influence on the wilderness qualities of the land). Again, this argument was rejected by Lady Wise who found that appropriate reference had been made to the other wind farms and that it was not inconsistent to describe the key characteristics of the landscape character of the site area as including “openness, vastness and remoteness” while acknowledging, in the context of the particular proposal, the cumulative impact it would have when seen in conjunction with other wind farm developments nearby.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.



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John Gray v Roderick John MacNeil (as Executor-Nominate to the Estate of the late Donald MacNeil), 25 January 2016 – validity of verbal lease and right to trade equipment on premises  

Sheriff Court case considering a purported lease of chip shop (which was converted from a petrol station forecourt shop) on South Uist. In early 2005, the parties reached a verbal agreement under which Mr Gray would lease the premises from Mr MacNeil for 15 years in return for paying staffing and running costs which would constitute rent. The agreement was not put in writing. Mr Gray bought equipment and the property was converted for use as a chip shop which opened for business in July 2005. The relationship between the parties deteriorated and in 2008, following a dispute, Mr MacNeil cut the electricity to the property and refused Mr Gray entry to the property. Mr MacNeil died in 2015 and Mr Gray raised an action against Mr MacNeil’s excecutor (Mr MacNeil Jnr).

There were essentially two issues for the court:

  1. Whether Mr Gray was entitled to the return of the chip shop equipment (or alternatively payment of the value of the chip shop equipment); and
  2. Whether, despite the legal requirement for the lease to be in writing, Mr Gray could recover damages (i.e. his loss of future profits) for material breach of the purported lease on the basis of the personal bar provisions contained in the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.

Return of the equipment
The sheriff found, on the evidence, that the chip shop equipment belonged to Mr Gray. Although, Mr MacNeil Jnr argued that that the equipment had nonetheless acceded[1] to the property, he failed to provide evidence relating to the conditions required (physical union, functional subordination and permanency) for accession to occur and the sheriff found that accession had not taken place.[2]

Verbal lease
Although a lease for more than a year requires to be in writing[3], Mr Gray argued that, in terms of the personal bar provisions contained in the 1995 Act[4], because Mr Gray had acted in reliance of the verbal lease with the knowledge and acquiescence of Mr MacNeil, Mr MacNeil had not been entitled to withdraw from the contract. However, after considering previous authorities[5], the sheriff found that the personal bar provisions in the 1995 Act only apply to the creation of rights which are purely personal whereas the verbal lease would also create real rights[6] (i.e. rights which are enforceable against the world rather than rights enforceable only between contracting parties). As such, the verbal lease was invalid and Mr MacNeil had been entitled to withdraw from it[7].

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.


[1] I.e. that the equipment had been fixed to the building in such a way as to become part of it (meaning that the owner of the building would also become the owner of the equipment).

[2] However there were some technical difficulties with Mr Gray’s pleadings regarding relating to delivery of the equipment/payment of the value and a further heading was fixed in that regard.

[3] 1995 Act s1(7).

[4] Section 1(3) and (4).

[5] The Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll 2006 SLT 591 and Gyle Shopping Centre General Partners Ltd v Marks and Spencer PLC, [2014] CSOH 122

[6] The verbal lease effected the creation of a real right in land (in the same way, for example, as a disposition effects the creation of real rights in land) in contrast to being purely a contract for the creation of a real right (i.e creating personal rights relating to the creation of a real right to be effected in a future conveyance, in the same way as missives are a contract for the creation of a real right in land – with the real right then being created by the subsequent registration of the disposition which the seller will be obliged to deliver in terms of the missives.) Although a lease can be seen both as a contract for the creation of a real right in land and as effecting a real right in land, the courts have taken the view (after consideration of the Scottish Law Commission’s, Report on Requirements of Writing (Report No112) at para 2.50) that the personal bar provisions contained in the 1995 Act cannot apply in situations where real rights are actually conveyed (even if a contract for the creation of an interest in land is created at the same time).

[7] The sheriff also noted that the result seemed harsh in the circumstances of the case.

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