ZYN, R v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council [2014] EWHC 1918 (Admin) – personal injury compensation fund must be disregarded in means-testing

The England and Wales High Court has ruled that a local authority was acting unlawfully in deciding that an individual’s access to a large personal injury compensation fund required her to pay the full cost of her care services.

This is from the case report:

“The claimant, whom I will refer to as “ZYN”, is severely disabled. She has a need for community care services, part of which is provided by the defendant local authority (“the Council”).”

“The issue raised by this case is whether capital derived from a personal injury settlement which is managed by a deputy appointed by the Court of Protection must be disregarded by a local authority when deciding whether the injured person can be required to contribute to the cost of care services which he or she receives.”

“It is common ground that all the capital derived from ZYN’s personal injury settlement falls within paragraph 44(2)(a) of Schedule 10 to the Income Support Regulations, being “an award of damages for a personal injury” to ZYN. It is her case that this capital is to be disregarded because it also falls within paragraph 44(1)(a) and/or (b), being capital (a) which is administered on behalf of ZYN by the Court of Protection and/or (b) which can only be disposed of by order or direction of the Court of Protection.”

“In my view, the only interpretation of paragraph 44(1)(b) which makes rational sense is an interpretation which treats the whole of the capital of ZYN as falling within its scope even after an order has been made which permits a deputy to withdraw a sum of money either for a particular purpose or for the general use and benefit of ZYN. There is no difficulty as a matter of language in saying that, until the money is actually spent, it remains part of a fund which can only be disposed of by an order or direction of the court: it does not cease to be part of such a fund simply because the court has made the requisite order. Moreover, for the reasons indicated, an interpretation which treats a sum as falling outside the scope of the provision when an order permitting disposal is made just because no further order of the court is now needed leads to absurd consequences and is not in my view a result which any rational legislator could have intended.”

“I therefore conclude that the whole of the capital of ZYN falls within paragraph 44(1)(b) of Schedule 10 to the Income Support Regulations.”

The full case report can be found here.

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