Background
This is an Outer House case concerning a lease of premises at the Gyle Shopping Centre in Edinburgh under which Gyle was the landlord and Marks & Spencer, the tenant.

Gyle entered an agreement with Primark for the erection of a new store on land which included part of a car park. However, Marks & Spencer’s premises were let together with a one-third pro indiviso share of shared areas which included the car park. In an earlier decision Lord Tyre had found that (1) the building of the Primark store would breach the lease with Marks & Spencer and (2) a meeting of the shopping centre management committee approving construction of the new building was not sufficient to vary the terms of the lease.

Arguments
Here Gyle argued that, although the lease had not been varied, Marks & Spencer were personally barred from objecting to the construction of the building as Marks & Spencer’s representatives had agreed to the building at the shopping centre management committee and that Gyle had relied on that agreement with their knowledge.

In particular Gyle argued that M&S was personally barred:

1. in terms of s1(3) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995;
2. in terms of the (pre-1995 Act) common law rule of rei interventus; or
3. by waiving its right under the lease.

Decision
Lord Tyre rejected those arguments.

The 1995 Act
Lord Tyre found (in accordance with the decision of Lord Drummond Young in Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll[1]) that s1(3) does not apply to leases; noting that s1(3) applies only to separate contracts relating to the land (i.e. transactions giving rise to merely personal rights) and not to dispositions and other deeds which actually effect the creation or transfer of an interest in land (i.e. transactions giving rise to a real right).

Rei interventus
With regard to the common law rule of rei interventus, Lord Tyre found that the (pre-1995 Act) common law rules (relating to both rei interventus and homologation) had been replaced in their entirety by the statutory rules contained in the 1995 Act and did not continue in parallel.

Waiver
On the subject of a potential waiver of Marks & Spencer’s rights in the lease, Lord Tyre said the following:

 “In my opinion, the evidence falls well short of establishing that there has been voluntary, informed and unequivocal waiver by [Marks & Spencer] of its right to prevent the construction and leasing of the building.  It seems to me that [Gyle’s] analysis perpetuates its original error of treating [Marks & Spencer’s] representatives who attended and approved the minutes of Management Committee meetings as equivalent to [Marks & Spencer] itself.  It wrongly characterises the conduct of those individuals as the conduct of [Marks & Spencer].  As I have already held, those individuals were not empowered in terms of [Marks & Spencer’s] lease to take decisions affecting [Marks & Spencer’s] real rights in the Shared Areas.  There was no evidence to indicate that they were even aware of what those rights were, although it was clear that the question of real rights was given no consideration by those representing [Gyle].  Nor was there any evidence of actings on the part of any person within [Marks & Spencer’s] organisation who was truly responsible for taking decisions regarding the variation of real rights under the lease which might induce [Gyle] to believe that [Marks & Spencer] regarded such decision-making as falling within the competence of the Management Committee.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here

(See also summaries of decisions finding (1) that M&S had not consented to the building of the Primark Store and that the building of the store without consent would be a breach of the lease (2)  that M&S was not unreasonably withholding consent to the Primark development.)

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Inner House case concerning a lease of a unit in a large (and mostly unoccupied) industrial complex in Shotts. Dem-Master were the landlords and Alba, the tenants.

Background
Dem-Master raised an action for payment in respect of electricity and outstanding rent. Alba disputed that the sums were due and a secondary issue arose regarding access to the property. Alba argued that Dem-Master had restricted vehicular access to the property by securing gates and locking loading bay doors which were used to allow heavy goods plants and equipment to be manoeuvred into the premises.

Alba sought an interim interdict to prevent Dem-Master restricting access to the premises in such a way as to prevent their rights under the lease. Dem-master granted an undertaking allowing access via a defined route and Alba dropped their motion for interim interdict but subsequently returned to court arguing that Dem-master had failed to comply with the undertaking.

Arguments
Alba argued that they were unable to carry on their business and that they wished to vacate their premises and move to other premises but that they were unable to remove their plant and machinery without access to the loading bay door. Dem-Master argued that Alba had no right to exercise access via the loading bay doors in terms of the lease and, in view of the fact that Alba’s published accounts showed them to be insolvent, they were concerned that removal of Alba’s plant and machinery would prevent use of the Landlord’s hypothec (i.e. the right to retain a tenant’s property as security).

Decision
In the Outer House the motion for interim interdict was granted so as to allow access via the loading bay doors. The Inner House found that, on a construction of the lease (under which the landlord, acting reasonably was entitled to designate the route of the rights of access), it could not be said that Alba had the right to use the loading bay doors. However, the court did find that the balance of convenience (required to allow an interim interdict) did favour access over another route which would allow Alba to operate their business from the premises (but which would not allow the removal of their heavy plant and machinery from the unit).

The case was put out by order to discuss the exact terms of the order for interim interdict.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Sheriff Court case concerning the remedies available to a creditor (Acorn) under a standard security after it had granted a further security (and also assigned the personal obligation to pay the sums due) to a third party (Connaught) over the first security in its favour (The second security securing an advance made to Acorn by Connaught).

When Mr Smith (the debtor under the first security) failed to pay the sums due under the first security, Acorn served a calling up notice on him and, when he failed to comply, raised an action to enforce the first security and eject Mr Smith from the subjects (agricultural property). Mr Smith argued that, as the personal obligation to pay Acorn had been assigned to Connaught by way of the second security, there was no longer any debt due to Acorn. As such, Acorn had no title to sue.

The sheriff accepted Acorn’s argument to the effect that the statutory rights in a standard security which arise under the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 are separate to the common law rights in terms of the personal obligation contained in the separate contract between Acorn and Mr Smith. Both sets of rights could be held by different people. Acorn remained the creditor under the first security and, as such, was entitled to exercise the statutory rights to enforce the security albeit that the common law rights in the personal obligation had been assigned to Connaught and enforcement of the security would ultimately result in a payment to Connaught. This was logical as it provided Acorn with a powerful means of ensuring it could meet its obligation to Connaught and, from Connaught’s point of view,  it was right that a procedure by which Acorn could meet its obligation to them (along with any related costs) should be Acorn’s responsibility.

Accordingly the sheriff found that Acorn had both title and interest to sue.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Inner House case considering a petition brought by Sustainable Shetland for judicial review of the Scottish Minister’s decision to grant planning permission to Viking Energy Partnership for a 103 turbine wind farm development on a site of approximately 50 square miles on mainland Shetland.

When the relevant statutory provisions[1] were being considered in the Outer House, it was discovered that Viking did not hold a licence to generate electricity. On a construction of the provisions, Lady Clark found that it was not open to the Ministers to grant consent for the building of the wind farm to persons who were not licence holders or exempt persons[2] in terms of the legislation.

Lady Clark also concluded that there was merit in Sustainable Shetland’s argument that there had been a failure on the part of the Ministers to take proper account of their obligations under the Wild Birds Directive 2009[3], finding that they had failed to properly engage with the directive in any meaningful way when reaching their conclusion.

Arguments
The Scottish Ministers’ appealed on two grounds:

1. Whether, on a proper interpretation of the Electricity Act, an application for section 36 consent could competently be made only by a person who held a licence under section 6 or an exemption under section 5 (the competency issue).
2. Whether, having regard to the information before them, the Scottish Ministers had failed to engage with their obligations under the Wild Birds Directive (the whimbrel issue).

Decision
The Inner House allowed the appeal on both grounds.

The Competency issue
Sustainable Shetland decided not to insist on the competency issue and did not present any arguments based on it. However, at the suggestion of Lady Clark, an amicus curiae[4] was appointed to present the argument. Nevertheless, after presenting a written argument on the point, the amicus curiae indicated that he no longer considered that he could support the Lady Clark’s decision on the point. The Inner House considered that Sustainable Shetland and the amicus curiae had been correct in their decision not to support the decision of the Lady Clark on the competency issue.

The Inner House found that the holding of a licence is not a condition precedent to the granting of consent of section 36 and agreed with the reasoning of Lord Doherty in Trump International Gold Club Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers in which the same argument (adopted by Trump following Lady Clark’s decision) was rejected [4].

The whimbrel issue
With regard to the whimbrel issue, the Inner House found that, instead of deciding whether the Ministers’ decision had been lawful once account had been taken of the Wild Birds Directive, Lady Clark had considered whether the Ministers had demonstrated that they had fully understood and complied with their obligations under the directive irrespective of the likely effect of the consent on the bird population. The Inner House noted that, whilst the Minister’s decision letter did not make specific reference to the Wild Birds Directive, it was clear from the letter that the decision had been made having regard to an assessment of the impact on the whimbrel population which had been put forward by Scottish Natural Heritage under reference to the Directive.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

(See also appeal to the Supreme Court here.)

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

The Community Empowerment (Scotland) Bill was introduced to the Scottish Parliament on 11 June 2014. It makes provision (amongst other things) for:

• the amendment of Part 2 (community right to buy) of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003;
• extending the community right to buy to enable bodies to buy abandoned or neglected land;
• establishing registers of common good property and about disposal and use of such property; and
• the restatement and amendment of the law on allotments.

Community right to buy
Currently, it is not possible to exercise the community right to buy over areas which have been designated as “excluded land”. Excluded land comprises land with settlements of over 10,000 people meaning that in effect the community right to buy is confined to rural areas. The new Bill makes amendments allowing community bodies to register an interest in respect of land across Scotland, irrespective of the size of settlement effectively extending the right to urban areas. In addition the Bill makes various technical and procedural amendments aimed at making the procedure for exercising the right to buy easier and more flexible.

Abandoned and neglected land
The Bill also amends the 2003 Act to extend the community right to buy to allow community bodies to purchase neglected and abandoned land where the owner is not willing to sell.

Common Good land
The Bill places a statutory duty on local authorities to establish and maintain a register of all property held by them for the common good. It also requires local authorities to publish their proposals and consult community bodies before disposing of or changing the use of common good assets.

Allotments
The Bill repeals and replaces the Allotment Acts with the aim of updating and simplifying the legislation. It requires local authorities to take reasonable steps to provide more allotments if waiting lists exceed certain trigger points and provides protection for both local authorities and plotholders.

The Bill is available from the Scottish Parliament here.

The explanatory notes are available here.

Supreme Court case of some complexity in which the Liquidator of the Letham Grange Development Company sought reduction of a security over the Letham Grange resort near Arbroath. The case involves a number of companies all controlled by a Mr Liu and his family.

The Liquidator argued that the holder of the security, Foxworth (a company controlled by Mr Liu), had not acquired the rights under the security in good faith and for value. The Liquidator had previously successfully challenged a disposition by Letham Grange in favour of Nova Scotia Limited (also a company controlled by Mr Liu) on the basis that it was a gratuitous alienation. (The property which had been purchased by Letham Grange for £2,105,000 was sold to Nova Scotia for only £248,100.)

In the Outer House Lord Glennie found that there had not been a gratuitous alienation accepting Mr Lui’s evidence that the price had been reduced as there had been loans made by Mr Liu’s family in favour of Letham to finance the original purchase and that Foxworth (having assumed liability) was obliged to repay those loans to the family.

The Inner House have allowed an appeal finding that, to avoid a gratuitous alienation, the consideration given in exchange for the granting of the disposition of the resort to Nova Scotia required to be enforceable at the time when the disposition was granted. However, at that date, there was no enforceable obligation binding Nova Scotia to repay the loans to the family. Even if that had not been the case, taking account of all of the circumstances, the Inner House found that the various transactions surrounding Letham Grange had been intended to defeat the claims of lawful creditors.  For those reasons a decree granting reduction of the standard security was given. The Inner House also found that Lord Glennie had failed to give satisfactory reasons for the factual conclusions he had reached on the evidence.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed an appeal of the Inner House decision.  Whilst the Inner House had been correct to identify that an appellate court can interfere where it is satisfied that the trial judge has gone “plainly wrong”, it had erred in concluding that Lord Glennie had been “plainly wrong” in this case.

Lord Glennie had clearly understood that the critical issue was whether “the alienation was made for adequate consideration”. He was aware that an obligation on the part of Nova Scotia could only constitute part of the consideration for the sale if it was undertaken as the counterpart of the obligations undertaken by Letham Grange. His opinion had focused whether, and not when, any obligation was taken to assume the Letham Grange debts and he had been entitled to accept Mr Liu’s evidence on that point. The Supreme Court noted that Lord Glennie had taken into account the various criticisms of Mr Liu’s evidence before concluding that his evidence was credible and reliable and also noted that the weight given to the material evidence was pre-eminently a matter for the trial judge (subject only to the requirement that his findings be reasonable).

The full judgement is available from the Supreme Court here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Inner House case considering whether damages were due in respect of wrongful interdict after an interim interdict was granted on the basis of a deed which was later rectified with retrospective effect.

Background
Mr Mirza was the owner of a shop and yard on Cumberland Road in Glasgow. Mrs Salim took an assignation of a lease of the premises. The parties had intended that only the shop (and not the yard) be let to Mrs Salim. However, due to an error, both the shop and yard were included in her title.

Mr Mirza commenced construction of a new shop in the yard. A dispute then arose as to who had a real right in the yard and, in February 2008, Mrs Salim sought and obtained an interim interdict preventing Mr Mirza from entering the yard and building and operating the new shop. However, in August 2009 the Court found that the yard had been included in the lease as the result of a conveyancing error (for which neither of the parties were responsible) and granted a judicial rectification[1] of the lease removing the yard from the leased subjects (the rectification being retrospective in effect). Mr Mirza then sought damages for wrongful interdict.

In the Outer House Lord Woolman refused to grant damages taking the view that, although rectification altered the deed and the register, “it did not airbrush history. It did not convert a rightful interdict into a wrongful one”.

Decision
By majority decision[2] the Inner house allowed an appeal and found that Mr Mirza was entitled to damages[3].

After construing ss8 and 9 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985 (which deals with rectification of defectively expressed documents) and s9(3A) of the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979[4] (rectification of the Land register), the court found that the clear effect of the legislation was that rectification would act retrospectively (i.e. the rectified entry would take effect from the date the original entry was made)[5].

The court also confirmed that the obtaining of an interim interdict is at the risk of the applicant meaning that, if an application is ultimately found to be unsuccessful, the applicant will be liable for loss caused by the interim interdict. In the words of Lady Dorrian:

“The position in relation to interim interdict is clear, and well understood by practitioners, namely that such an order is sought periculo petentis [at the risk of the perpetrator].  This rule means that, in general, where loss has been caused, damages will automatically follow where an interdict has turned out to be unjustified.  A petitioner for interdict perils his case, and places himself at risk of damages if it prove to be otherwise, that he will eventually be vindicated in his claim.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Case from the Lands Tribunal for Scotland considering the title to the common parts of a development at Corstorphine Road in Edinburgh.

The case follows on from PMP Plus Ltd v The Keeper of the Registers of Scotland and others[1] and Lundin Homes Ltd v. the Keeper. PMP confirmed that it was not competent to convey the common parts of a development which are described by reference to a future event (e.g. conveying what will be left when the development has been completed). Lundin also made it clear that, for titles registered in the Land Register, there must be a sufficient description[2] of property within the conveyance[3] (whereas for Sasines titles it is competent for the extent of property to be identified by extrinsic evidence).

This case considers whether the owners of houses within the development with titles recorded in the Register of Sasines[4] may have obtained rights in the common parts by prescriptive possession.

The dispositions in favour of the home owners contained the following clause:

 “… (Three) a right in common with the proprietors of all the other dwellinghouses in the development of which the subjects hereby disponed form part to areas of open space amenity ground and/or wooded areas and unallocated parking spaces formed or to be formed in accordance with the requirements of the Local Planning Authority (the exact extent of which areas may not yet have been defined) unless and until said areas and unallocated parking spaces may be formally taken over by the Local Authority …”.

The developer (Miller Homes) received a conveyance of an undeveloped area of ground within the development from a group company and registered a title to it in the Land Register. The Keeper excluded indemnity on the basis that proprietors of the houses who held Sasine titles may have acquired prescriptive rights of common ownership in the area.

Miller argued that, in accordance with the decision in PMP, the house owner’s titles were not habile to found prescription as they were described by reference to an uncertain future event.

The Tribunal found that, whilst it was not possible to found prescription on titles to common areas still to be formed or to be defined[5] at the time the dispositions of the individual plots within the development were granted, the clause also refers to areas which had been formed and defined and it was possible that prescription could run on Sasine titles where the common area had been formed and defined at the time a disposition[6] of the relevant plot was granted.

No individual owner had entered appearance in appeal and the Tribunal decided to re-intimate the appeal to all the individual proprietors in order that they should have an opportunity to enter appearance and attempt to set up a competing title.

The full decision is available from the Lands Tribunal for Scotland here.

A blog on Registers of Scotland’s policy with regard to development common areas is available here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Sheriff Court case considering whether a servitude right of access had been created by prescription. Mr and Mrs Sidebottom sought declarator that they had established a servitude right of access to their property (in Fyvie in Aberdeenshire) across the properties of Mr and Mrs Green and Sir George Forbes-Leith.

Mr and Mrs Green argued that the Sidebottoms had not taken access over the route for the necessary 20 year period and that the use had been infrequent and not of the “right kind”. The Greens contended that the Sidebottoms use of the access had been based on a mistaken belief that their title contained a servitude right of access over the roadway in question. They also argued that use of the access had not been peaceable pointing to a letter written by Mrs Sidebottom which referred to an ongoing dispute over the access and to the fact that the access had been obstructed.

The sheriff found that the decision came down to a question of reliability and credibility and preferred the evidence of the Sidebottoms. Although the access had been obstructed, the sheriff accepted Mrs Sidebottom’s evidence that they had nevertheless continued to use the access and inferred from that and the lack of evidence to the contrary that use of the access was nonetheless peaceable. Even although the Sidebottoms’ use of the access may have been based on a mistaken belief that they had a right to use the access in their title, the sheriff found that Mrs Sidebottom’s letter was further evidence that the Sidebottoms were asserting their right to use the access.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

Outer House case in concerning the interpretation of the lease of a plot in a chalet park in Lochgoilhead.

Mr and Mrs Ramsay bought a (removable) chalet in the park (for £20.5k) from Drimsynie. As part of the same transaction, the Ramsays entered into a 10 year ground lease of the plot on which the chalet was located. The lease provided that, on expiry of the lease, Drimsynie would have:

 “..the option to acquire the chalet at a price to be agreed, failing agreement at a price to be determined by an arbiter to be appointed in terms of clause FIFTEENTH…or offer to (the Ramsays) a renewal of the lease for a period to be determined by (Drimsynie)….”

When Drimsynie terminated the lease (following a change policy which involved replacing chalets with newer, larger, and more expensive chalets), an arbiter was been appointed to determine the sum to be paid for the chalet and a dispute developed as to how the arbiter should approach the valuation of the chalet. The Ramsays argued that the chalet should be valued on the assumption of a continuing right to occupy it on the plot on which it was located. Alternatively, Drimsynie contended the arbiter should consider only the market value of the chalet itself on the basis it would be removed from the plot.

Lord Malcolm found that his task was to interpret the lease by reference to the understanding of a reasonable person in the position of the parties at the time the lease was entered. It was important to note that the lease was not a stand alone contract and was linked to the associated purchase of the chalet. The effect of the relevant clause was that the Ramsays could remain in occupation of the chalet on the plot in terms of the lease until the chalet was purchased by the Drimsynie. If Drimsynie wanted to put a new chalet on the site and sell it to someone else they would require to purchase the old chalet first. In Lord Malcolm’s view the parties would have understood that Drimsynie was buying out the Ramsays’ right to continue to use the chalet on the plot in terms of the lease. As such, a reasonable person in the position of the parties at the time of the lease would have understood that Drimsynie would purchase the chalet on the same footing as they sold it. He found support for this view from the element of permanence associated with the chalet, noting that:

• the lease described the chalet as having been “erected” on the plot
• although simply resting on its foundations, it was connected to services, including water and drainage
• the chalet had been on the site since about 1967 and was shown on the OS map
• the Ramsays paid council tax in respect of the chalet.

Lord Malcolm therefore held that that the arbiter should value the chalet on the basis that it could be used on the site for so long as it remained habitable.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.